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the goods before giving the receipt, to determine their condition;
Skinner v. Chicago and Bock Island Railroad Co., 12 Iowa
Rep. 191. This seems to be the only just rule in regard to the
subject. But we apprehend the practice has been different, to
some extent: express companies, requiring the name of the consignee upon their delivery books, which amounts to a receipt for
delivery, which presumptively means in good condition; but, at
the same time, refusing time or opportunity for examination. We
are sure this practice prevails to some extent, but we believe,
without any just foundation.
There are many other points we would be glad to examine, but
we have no space. Our readers will find a valuable case, upon
I. F. R.
this subject, in another place in this number.
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The liabilities of common carriers and forwarders, independent of any express
stipulation in the contract, are entirely different.
The common carrier who undertakes to carry goods for hire is an insurer of
the property intrusted to him, and is legally responsible for acts against which he
cannot provide, from whatever cause arising; the acts of God and the public
enemy alone excepted.
Forwarders are not insurers, but they are responsible for all injuries to property, while .in their charge, resulting from negligence or misfeasance of themselves,
their agents or employees.
Restrictions upon the common law liability of a common carrier, for his
benefit, inserted in a receipt drawn up by himself and signed by him alone, for
goods intrusted to him for transportation, are to be construed most strongly against
the common carrier.
If a common carrier, who undertakes to transport goods, for hire, from one place
to auother, "and deliver to address," inserts a clause in a receipt signed by him alone,
and given to the person intrusting him with the goods, stating that the carrier is "not
to be responsible except as forwarder," this restrictive clause does not exempt the
carrier from liability for loss of the goods, occasioned by the carelessness or negligence of the employees on a steamboat owned and controlled by other parties than
the carrier, but ordinarily used by him, in his business of carrier, as a means of
conveyance. The managers and employees of thc steamboat are, in legal contem-
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plation, for the purposes of the transportation of such goods, the managers and
employees of the carrier.
A receipt signed by a common carrier for goods intrusted to him for transportation for hire, which restricts his liability, will not be construed as exempting
him from liability for loss occasioned by negligence in the agencies he employs,
unless the intention to thus exonerate him is expressed in the instrument in plain
and unequivocal terms.
Under our Practice Act a complaint cannot be amended in tiis court so as to
make it correspond with the verdict. The District Court, in a proper case, before
judgment, may direct the complaint to be so amended.

The opinion of the court was delivered by
SAWYER, J.-This is an action to recover the sum of $10,755,
the value of a package of gold bullion delivered to defendants, at
Los Angeles, tQ be transported to San Francisco, and which was
lost in consequence of the explosion of the boiler of the steamtug Ada Hancock, while being transported in charge of defendants' messenger from the shore, at San Pedro, to the anchorage of the steamer Senator.
The plaintiff, to maintain the action on his part, proved that
"the defendants were, and are a company engaged in the public
express business ; that is to say, in receiving, forwarding, carrying, and delivering, by sea or by land, for any one who employs
them, treasure, goods, and packages for hire, from place to place,
within and without this state, in care of their own messengers, in
vessels, and conveyances, and steamers, and boats, and vehicles
owned by others, and ordinarily used by the public at large, as
the common and public mode of transportation and conveyance.
"That said defendants had an agency and an agent at Los
Angeles for the purposes of their said public express business;
their principal office and agency for the state of California being
at San Francisco.
"That the usual modes of public conveyance and transportation
between Los Angeles and San Francisco were, at the time hereinafter mentioned, and for a long time prior thereto, by a line of
stage-coaches the whole way, and also by stage-epach from Los
Angeles to San Pedro, and from San Pedro to San Francisco by
a steamer called the Senator; that an agent of the defendant
always travelled on said steamer Senator, between San Fran
cisco and San Pedro, who, on arriving at San Pedro, proceeded
to Los Angeles by stage-coach, and there received from the Los
Angeles agent all express matter that had been left there to be
VOL. XIV.-2
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forwarded, carried, and delivered, returned with such express
matter to San Pedro in time for the steamer Senator's return
voyage, placed and shipped the express matter on board of such
steamer, and returned on the steamer with the express matter in
his charge to San Francisco, where it was in the first instance
delivered at the general agency, and then delivered by such
agency to the consignees or owners.
" That it was usual and customary for the steamer Senator,
and all other coast steamers, on arriving at or approaching San
Pedro, to anchor some three miles from shore, there not being
sufficient depth of water to enable such vessels to approach the
shore. That the usual means and mode of transporting goods
and passengers between the shore and steamer was by steam-tug
and lighters.
"That one of such usual and ordinary means was by a steam
tug-boat of about forty-two tons burthen, called the Ada, Hancock; that is, it was usual and customary for the defendants'
messenger to go from the shore to the steamer -with the express
treasure in charge on said tug-boat, the heavier express freight
being usually transported on lighters. That the express company
was charged by the steamer the usual price for the passage 6f the
express messenger and freight for all express goods, except
treasure, which was carried in an iron box called the treasure-box,
and was kept in the special charge of the messenger while on
board the steamer, and no charge made by the steamer for its
transportation.
"That as to any and all treasure transported by defendants
upon said steam-tug Ada Hancock, or upon said steamer Senator,
no bill of lading was ever given, and no written contract of
affreightment was ever made therefor, neither was any note or
memorandum in writing of the true character or value thereof
ever given by the defendants, or by their agents or servants, to
the master, or officers, or agent, or owner of said steam-tug, or
said steamer $enator. That no freight was ever paid by or
charged against defendants or their agents for treasure laden by
them on board said steam-tug to or from said steamer Senator.
That the defendants used the usual means of public transportation
in conducting their business, which was notorious, and known to
the plaintiff at the time hereinafter stated.
"That on the 21st day of April 1863, the plaintiff delivered at
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the city of Los Angeles, California, to the agent of the defendants at Los Angeles, a package of gold bullion of the value of
$10,755, to be transported to San Francisco in consideration of the
sum of $80.65, then and there agreed to be paid to defendants by
plaintiff, and on such delivery received and accepted from said
agent a paper, partly printed and partly written, of which the following is a copy, the portion thereof italicised being written, and
the portion thereof not italicised being printed, namely:
"'WELLS, FARGO & CO.'S EXPRESS.
'Wells, Fargo & Co.,
" ' Express,
"' Los Angeles.

April 21, 1863.
"'Value, $1),755.
' ' Received of George F. ffooper, Dust and bullion. Package, value ten tlwusand seven hundred and fifty-five dollars.
"'Address, Geo. F. Hlooper, which we agree to forward to
San Francisco, and deliver to address.
"' 1In no event to be liable beyond our route as herein receipted. It is further agreed, and is part of the consideration of
this contract, that Wells, Fargo & Co. are not to be responsible
except as forwarders, nor for any loss or damage arising from the
dangers of railroad, ocean, or river navigation, fire, &c., unless
specially insured by them, and so specified on this receipt. For

the proprietors,

' Charges Col., $80.65.

"'P. BANNING,

Agent.

" Per SANFOlU.'

"Said package of gold bullion of the value of ten thousand
seven hundred and fifty-five dollars has never been delivered by
defendants to plaintiff, or to his address."
Defendants' agent, at Los Angeles, delivered said bullion to
one Ritchie, the messenger, or travelling agent of defendants
between Los Angeles and San Francisco, who took charge of the
same and transporte'd it to San Pedro by public stage-coach.
For the purpose of placing said bullion and other treasure on
board the steamer Senator, which then lay at anchor, as usual,
off the shore, for transportation to San Francisco, said Ritchie
placed it on board the steam-tug Ada Hancock, himself accompanying the bullion and having it in charge. Soon after, said
steam-tug having on board said bullion, said Ritchie and several
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other passengers for San Francisco started from the wharf foi
the purpose of placing said passengers, bullion, &c., on board said
steamer Senator. Before reaching the anchorage of the Senator,
the boiler of said steam-tug exploded, whereby the said Ritchie
and several other passengers were killed, and said bullion lost.
There was evidence tending to prove, that the explosion was
caused by the carelessness of the engineer and other officers of
the said steam-tug. Defendants had no interest in said steam-tug
and no control over her management or navigation. The agents
of defendants at Los Angeles had no authority to insure said
bullion. The plaintiff had no option as to insuring, or not insuring the same with defendants at Los Angeles. Insurance
could only be effeeted thereon with said defendants at their office
in San Francisco.
The court gave the jury the following instructions:"First. That if defendants be an express company, publicly
engaged in transporting freight from one place to another, for
hire, they are common carriers, and subject to all the responsibilities of common carriers, except so far as they have modified
them by agreement.
"1Second. That the mere fact that an express company use
their own vessels and steamers, or the vessels or steamers* of
others, in no way affects their liabilities as common carriers.
"1Third. That if Wells, Fargo & Co. shipped the treasure in
question on board the steamer Ada Hancock, and there was an
dxplosion of said steamer, by which the treasure was lost, and
that explosion was occasioned by the negligence of the parties in
charge of the Ada Hancock, then Wells, Fargo & Co. are liable
for the value of said treasure.
" Fourth. An express company which is in the habit of carrying, for hire, packages containing coin, dust, and other articles
of value, from one place to another, is a common carrier.
" Fifth. Express companies which carry packages over routes
where they employ other vehicles or means of conveyance than
their own, are common carriers.
" Sixth. They may, however, by contract, limit their liability
as common carriers, and if you find by the evidence that the
defendants in this case did so limit their liability to the plaintiff,
then the court charges you that such limit of responsibility musi
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govern; but that does not relieve defendants from ordinary care
in the discharge of their duties.
" Seventh. The special agreement received in evidence cannot
exempt defendants from accountability for losses occasioned by a
defect in the vehicle or mode of conveyance used to effect the
transportation.
"Eighth. If you find, from the evidence, that defendants
undertook to forward the gold dust in question from Los Angeles,
and deliver the same to plaintiff, at San Francisco, under a
special agreement limiting the liability, defendants must be
deemed to have undertaken the same degree of responsibility as
that which attached to a private person, and were, therefore,
bound to use ordinary care in the custody of the gold-dust, and
its delivery, and to provide proper means of conveyance for its
transportation.
"Tenth. Should you find that the defendants shipped the
treasure on-board the steamer Ada Hancock, and there was an
explosion of said steamer by which the treasure was lost, and that
the explosion was occasioned by the negligence of the persons in
charge of her, then defendants are liable for the value of the sailI
treasure, by reason that they are responsible for injuries caused
by the negligence of the agencies they employ in fulfilling the
obligations of their undertaking."
The court also refused the following instruction asked on the
part of defendants, to which refusal defendants excepted -"That if the defendants, by their agents, selected the steam-tug
Ada Hancock for transportation of the treasure from the wharf to
the Senator, and the jury find that at the time of such selection
and of placing the treasure on board, the said tug was sufficient
for the purpose of such contemplated transportation, then that the
defendants are not responsible if the treasure was lost by any
subsequent carelessness of the officers of the boat."
It is admitted" by appellants' counsel that defendants, as to the
transportation of said bullion, were acting in the capacity of
common carriers; and such was undoubtedly their legal relation
to said bullion at the time of its loss. It is further admittedand this proposition also admits of little doubt-that defendants,
under the law applicable to common carriers, are liable for its
loss, unless such liability is restricted by the express stipulations
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of the contract between the parties for the conveyance of said
bullion.
It is insisted, however, on the part of defendants, that the
contract contains express stipulations which exonerate them from
all liability for the loss under the circumstances disclosed by the
record; while on the part of plaintiff, this proposition is controverted. If mistaken on this point, it is further claimed by the
plaintiff, that any stipulation in a contract which purports to
exonerate a common carrier from loss resulting from the careless.
ness, negligence, or misfeasance of the carrier, or of his servants
or agents, is contrary to the policy of the law and void. It is not
pretended-and it could not with any show of reason be pre.
tended-that the loss in question is within the meaning of the last
clause of the receipt set out in the record relating to the dangers
of .navigation, &c. The clause relied on by defendants to relieve
themselves from responsibility is as follows: " It is further
agreed, and it is a part of the consideration of this contract,
that Wells, Fargo & Co. are not to be responsible except as
forwarders."
The liabilities of common carriers and forwarders, independent
of any express stipulation in the contract, are entirely different.
"The common carrier who undertakes to carry goods for hire is
bound to deliver them at all events, unless injured or destroyed
by the act of God, or the king's enemies:" Edw. on Bailment
295. " common carrier is regarded by the law as an insurer
of the property intrusted to him; or, in other words, he is legally
responsible for acts against which he could not provide, from
whatever cause arising, the acts of God and the public enemy only
excepted: Angell on Carriers, § 67. There are many accidents
against which common carriers cannot protect themselves by the
exercise of the utmost care and skill on the part of themselves
and their employees, for the result of which they are nevertheless
responsible: Edw. on Bail. 454, et seq., and Angell on Carriers,
ch. 11, and cases cited. But the liability of " forwarders" is like
that of warehousemen and common agents, and is governed by the
general rule applicable to other bailees for hire not subject to
extraordinary liabilities. They are responsible for ordinary care,
skill, and diligence; that is, such care and diligence as prudent
men in similar circumstances usually exercise in the management
of their own business: Story on Bail. § 444. They are not, it is
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true, insurers like common carriers, but they are responsible for
all injuries to property while in their charge resulting from negligence or misfeasance of themselves, their. agents or employees.
In view of these principles governing the liabilities of "1carriers"
and " forwarders," what is the effect of the disputed clause in the
contract under consideration upon the rights of the parties, plaintiff and defendants ? What is the extent of the restriction upon
the common law liabilities of the defendants ? The language must
be taken most strongly against the defendants: Edw. on Bail.
492. The instrument is executed by them alone. It was drawn
up with care, in language selected by themselves, the blank form
having been printed in advance ready to be presented to all persons offering property for transportation by their express. The
restrictions were for their benefit. The owners of packages sent
by express rarely examine with care, or indeed have .an opportunity to critically consider, the terms of the receipt presented to
them; and general terms, under such circumstances, are apt to
mislead. These are some of the reasons for the rule given in the
books. In construing a covenant in a charter-party, Mr. Justice
CURTIS said: "1The rule of construction as to exceptions is, that
they are to be taken most strongly against the party for whos3
benefit they are introduced. * * * These words of exception
being introduced by the covenantor for his own benefit, if they
are capable of bearing a more or less extended meaning, the rule
requires that meaning to be allowed to them which is least beneficial to the covenantor: Avery v. 3lJerrill, 2 Curtis 11. And Mr.
Chief Justice GIBSON, in Attwood v. 1eliance Transportation
Company, 9 Watts 88, in relation to a restriction in a contract by
a carrier, said: " Though it is perhaps too late to say that a
carrier may not accept his charge in special terms, it is not too
late to say that the policy which dictated the rule of the common
law requires that exceptions to it be strictly interpreted, and that
it is his duty to bring his case strictly within them." And such
is the well-settlea rule of construction in such cases.
The contract of defendants is not merely to forward the bullion,
but to " forward to San Francisco and deliver to address."
They are not merely to start it upon the way by some suitable
conveyance, but are to see that it reaches its destination, and are
to 11deliver to address." They were undoubtedly common carriers, and not forwarders in the technical sense of the term. But
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there was an evident intention on the part of defendants to
restrict their liability, and, although they were acting in the
capacity of carriers, they stipulated that they were "1not to be
responsible except as forwarders." As we construe this clause,
it does not mean that defendants would start the package upon
the way by some suitable conveyance, and that thereupon their
responsibility should cease, for that would be directly in conflict
with the covenant to "deliver to address." It simply means that
defendant would not assume the extraordinary responsibilities of
a common carrier, and become an insurer of the goods, except as
against loss resulting from the act of God or public enemies.
There is no express covenant or exception against loss by negligence on the part of defendants, or of those employed by them
in the transportation of their express matter. The exception fixes
the limit of responsibility by referring to another class of bailees,
whose responsibilities are different from those of carriers ; and the
meaning, as we construe the restrictive clause, is, that they will
be governed in respect to their liabilities by the same principles
as those applicable to forwarders. It is manifest that it was not
intended by this clause that all responsibility should cease as soon
as 'the package was started upon its passage from the office of
defendants at Los Angeles ; for the receipt also contains the
clause: "In no event to be liable beyond our route as herein
receipted." The route as therein receipted extended to San
Francisco. The printed form of the instrument used in this case
was evidently framed with a view to general use, where the point
of destination was beyond as well as within the routes established
and used by defendants. Evidently it was contemplated that
defendants might be liable for a loss occurring on their "route."
If it was intended to release themselves from all responsibility
while the package should be in transit, this clause would doubtless have been made to read: "l In no event to be liable for any
loss arising after leaving our office at Los Angeles," or some
other language of equivalent import. The defendants were carriers, and the bullion was lost while in their possession in the
character of carriers. It was not received to be stored, or to be
started upon its passage merely by the first convenient opportunity ; but to be carried and delivered "to address," and for no
other purpose. There was no point at which defendants were in
fact mere forwarders, in the technical sense of the term, or in
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which they were warehoiusemen. The goods were- never in their
possession in such character, but in the character of carriers only.
They could not be liable in a character which they never occupied;
and their contract that while they are carriers they shall only be
liable "as forwarders," in connection with the other language of
the instrument, can only mean that the liability shall be governed
by the principles of law applicable to forwarders ; that is, that they
shall only be liable for losses arising from a want of ordinary care
on the part of themselves, and in the agencies made use of by them
in the exercise of their ordinary business of carriers.
The word "as," is defined in the last edition of Webster's
Dictionary as follows: "1Like; similar to; of the same kind, or
in the same manner; in the manner in which." And this is obviously the ordinary import of the word standing in relations similar
to that in the instrument under consideration. Defendant's liability was to be "1similar to' that of forwarders--" of the same
kind." They were to be liable "in the same manner"-" in the
manner in which"-forwarders are liable. In what manner are
forwarders responsible ? Of what kind is their liability ? They
are not insurers, like carriers, but they are liable for losses of
goods while in their custody resulting from negligence of themselves and those whom they employ in their business of forwarders.
And if a forwarder, or warehouseman, instead of using his own
warehouse, and employing his own subordinates, should, for a
stipulated sum paid to the owner, use in his business the warehouse of another person, who employs and controls the subordinates, there can be no doubt that he would be liable for a loss of
the goods intrusted to his care occurring while in his possession,
and resulting from the negligence of such subordinates, although
not under his control. If the liability of these defendants under
their contract is to be "1 similar to" that of. forwarders-if it is
of "1the same kind"-if they are to be responsible 1 in the same
manner," then they are liable for any loss resulting from the negligence of themselves, or negligence in the agencies employed by
them, while the bullion was in their custody and control; and
that custody, without doubt, continued up to the moment of the
loss, and would have continued but for the loss up to the time
when it would have reached its destination, and been delivered
"1to address." The fact that defendants made use of various
public conveyances, .heir messenger with the treasure travelling
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a part of the way by stage, a part by steam-tug and lighters, and
a part by ocean steamer, makes no difference as to their liability.
For defendants' purposes the managers of those various convey.
ances were their agents and employees. Defendants had the means
of holding the proprietors of those various vehicles used in their
business of expressmen responsible to them, had they chosen to
do so. If they did not take the proper means to secure themselves, it was their own fault. The defendants, although employing public conveyances, were still carriers having the actual custody and management of the treasure during the transit, as well
as while it remained at the office of defendants at the extremities
of their route. Ritchie, the messenger of the defendants, was in
the actual custody of the treasure during the transit. Suppose,
by the carelessness of Ritchie in transferring the treasure from
the steam-tug to the Senator, it had been dropped into the
ocean and lost, can it be pretended that the defendants would
have been exempt from liability under the restrictive clause of
their contract under consideration ? Would it be claimed, in such
case, that the liability of defendants ceased as soon as the treasure left their office at Los Angeles? We do not think any such
construction would be claimed for the stipulation. If the defendants would not be protected by the exception against loss from the
negligence of one of their servants, why should it protect them
against the negligence of another, who as to the same matter is
in law their servant or agent ? Both are, in contemplation of law,
the agents or employees of defendants, and the acts of both are the
acts of defendants, and the language of the restrictive clause under
consideration no more excludes the liability resulting from the
negligence of one than from that of the other.
The defendants were common carriers, but under the contract
they were carriers with limited responsibilities. There is an
ample margin for the operation of the clause restricting the defendants' liability in the numerous accidents and losses not arising
out of negligence, or malfeasance, and not even comprehended in
the exception, "damages arising from the dangers of railroad,
ocean, or river navigation, fire," &c., against which the carrier is
an insurer, and from which forwarders are exempt.
Much stronger language has been held not to exempt bailees
from losses arising from negligence. To justify the conclusion
that such exemption is contemplated, the language should be
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unequivocal, and susceptible of no other reasonable interpretation. In Wells et al. v. Steam Navigation Company, 8 N. Y.
(4 Seld.) 375, the contract for towing a vessel from New York to
Albany contained the clause "a t the risk of the master and
owners thereof." Although persons engaged in towing vessels
have, in New York, been held not to be common carriers, the
defendants in that case were still held to be liable for damages
resulting from the carelessness of those engaged in towing the
vessel, notwithstanding this restriction in their contract. Mr.
Justice MASON said: "I cannot think the expression contained in
it, ' at he risk of the master and owners thereof,' was understood
by the parties as a protection against all kinds of negligence. It
would be an extraordinary contract, which should in express terms
give such a latitude in performing a kind of service of so important a character as the one under consideration; and to permit a
contract to have so unreasonable an effect as it would imply, the
intention of the parties should be clearly and unequivocally expressed, so as to leave no room for doubt or misconstruction: 6
John. 180; 7 Hill 547. In this contract nothing is said about
negligence." (Page 379.) In the same case Mr. Justice GARDINEr,
referring to Alexander v. Green, 7 Hill 544, said (page 382):
"We held then if a party vested with a temporary control of
another's property for a special-purpose of this sort would shield
himself from responsibility, on account of the gross negligence
of himself and servants, he must show his immunity on the face
of his agreement; and that a stipulation so extraordinary, so
contrary to the general custom and the understanding of men of
business, would not be implied from a general expression, to which
effect might otherwise be given"-and that he saw no reason
now for changing this rule. So also in Schieffelin v. Harvey.
where goods shipped to England were "returned to the shippers
at their own risk," and were purloined from the ship, the owner
of the ship was held liable. The Court say: "It is undoubtedly
true that the general operation of law may be controlled by the
agreement of the parties. But such agreement ought to be clear.
and capable of but one construction, unequivocally and necessarily
evincing that such was the intention of both the parties: 6 John.
180. A similar rule is stated in Buckman v. Shouse, 5 Rawle
189. As further instances of the application of the rule to
restrictive clauses in the contracts of carriers, see Sager v. P. S.
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.P.E. Railroad Co., 31 Maine 238, 239; De Rothsehild v.
Royal M]ail Steam Packet Co., 7 Exch. R. 734. So also in the
case of The New Jersey Steam Navigation Co. v. 11ferehants'
Bank, in the Supreme Court of the United States, 6 How. 344.
The contract provided that " the following conditions are stipulated and agreed to as part of this 6ontract, to wit: the said
crate, with its contents, is to be at all times exclusively at the
risk of the said William F. Harnden; and the New Jersey Steam
Navigation Company will not, in any event, be responsible either
to him or his employers, for the loss of any goods, wares, merchandise, money, notes, bills, evidences of debt, or property of
any or every description, to be conveyed or transported by him
in said crate or otherwise, in any manner, in the boats of the said
company. Further, that the said Harnden is to attach to his
advertisements, to be inserted in the public prints, as a common
carrier, exclusively responsible for his acts and doings, the following notice, which he is also to attach to his receipts or bills of
lading, to be given in all cases for goods, wares, and merchandise,
and other propertyiommitted to his charge, to be transported in
said crate or otherise:' 1Take Notice-William F. Harnden is alone responsible for
the loss or injury of any articles or property committed to his
care; nor is any risk assumed by, nor can any be attached to the
proprietors of the steamboats in which his crate may be and is
transported, in respect to it or its contents, at any time.' "
Mr. Justice NELsoN, in construing this contract, says (p. 383):
"The language is general and broad, and might very well comprehend every description of risk incident to the shipment. But
we think it would be going further than the intent of the parties
upon any fair and reasonable construction of the agreement, were
we to regard it as stipulating for wilful misconduct, gross negligence, or want of ordinary care, either in the seaworthiness of the
vessel, her proper equipments and furniture, or in her management by the master and hands. * * * If it is competent at
all for the carrier to stipulate for the gross negligence of himself,
and his servants or agents, in the transportation of the goods, it
should be required to be done, at least, in terms that would leave
no doubt as to the meaning of the parties."
To apply these principles to the case in hand, we think it cannot be said that the contract in question in clear and unequivocal
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terms necessarily evinces an intention on the part of both parties,
or of either party, that defendants shall be exonerated from any
loss resulting from negligence in the agencies employed by them
in the transportation of treasure committed to their care. If such
had been the intention, it certainly could, and doubtless would,
have been expressed in language about which there could be no
misapprehension by either party. Nothing is said about negligence. The language used is not such as necessarily expresses,
or as men would ordinarily employ to express the idea now
claimed for it, and if so used, it would be likely to mislead a
party to whom it is tendered ready executed upon the receipt of
his property for transportation. That plaintiff could not have
understood the contract in the sense claimed for it by the defend
ants, seems in the highest degree probable, for it can scarcely be
credited, that a man of ordinary capacity and intelligence would
commit so valuable a package to others to be transported a long
distance, without supposing that somebody would be responsible
to him for at least good faith, and ordinary care during the
transit. But if the construction claimed for the stipulation in
question is to prevail, the defendants were neither responsible
themselves for ordinary care, after the treasure left their office at
Los Angeles, nor bound to take the measures prescribed by the
statute to make the owners of the vessels used by them as a
means of transportation, responsible.
The language of the stipulation under consideration, at least,
admits of the construction which we have given it; and to hold
that the exception includes losses arising from negligence would,
in our judgment, be to adopt a strained construction in favor of
defendants, and to depart from its obvious import, while, as we
have seen the rule to be, the construction must be most strictly
against the defendants.
Holding, as we do, that the exception in the contract, for the
reasons stated, does not exempt the defendants from losseR resulting from the negligence of those in charge of the steam-tug, it
becomes unnecessary to determine the more difficult question, in
the present state of the authorities, as to the power of common
carriers by special contract to exonerate themselves from liabilities arising from the negligence of those employed by them in
their business of carriers.
The instructions of the court, considered in connection with the
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instrument in evidence, are substantially in accordance with the
views here expressed. We therefore find no error in them, or in
refusing the instruction asked by defendants.
The damages alleged in the complaint are $10,755, and judgment is asked for that amount only. The verdict and judgment
are for $11,740.87. This exceeds the amount embraced within
the issues. There is no provision in our Practice Act authorizing
this court to allow an amendment to the complaint making it
correspond with the verdict. The court below, before judgment,
might have permitted an amendment so as to make the complaint
correspond with the verdict, but this was not done. Upon consent of the respondent the judgment may be so modified as to
reduce the recovery to the amount claimed in the complaint.
Ordered, that respondent have fifteen days within which to file
his consent in writing, that the judgment be modified so as to
reduce the amount to the sum of $10,755, and upon filing such
consent in writing the judgment will be modified in pursuance
thereof. In default of filing such written consent, it is ordered
that judgment be entered reversing the judgment of the District
Court and granting a new trial.
It is further ordered, that appellants recover their costs of
appeal.
The foregoing case we regard as one
of great interest. The amount involved
and the peculiar character of the case,
would naturally have led to the most
careful scrutiny, both of court and counsel; and we feel the utmost confidence
in giving our full assent to each and all
the propositions so carefully and so ably
maintained by the learned judge.
1. The first question stated in the syllabus, which admits of any controversy,
is that in regard to the restrictions contained in the carrier's receipt. The proposition that such restrictions are to be
construed most strongly against the carrier, is only the common rule of construction in all analogous cases, that, in
pleadings or contracts, the words, in a
precise equipoise of intendment or import, shall be taken against the person
using the words. We believe the de-

cisions upon this point, stated in our
leading article, ante p. 8, would hare
justified the learned judge in stating
the proposition somewhat more strongly
against the carrier. We understand the
courts, as requiring satisfactory evidence,
that the owner, at the time he left the
goods for transportation, either did understand the nature of the conditions
upon which the carrier claimed to accept
them, or else, that he would have so understood them, but for his own want of
ordinary care. Ante, pp. 7, 8.
2. The proposition that such a restrictive clause, to the extent that the
express company are only to be responsible as "forwarders," could not be constrned as exempting the carrier from
responsibility for loss caused by the negligence of the employees on a steamboat, owned and controlled by other
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parties than the carrier, but ordinarily
used by him, in his business of carrier,
as a means of transportation; and that
in such case the employees of the steamboat are, in legal contemplation, the
servants of the carrier, seems not susceptible of much question. The clause
of exemption from responsibility, that the
carriers shall not be "responsible except as forwarders," in its precise terms
does not seem to have any just application to that portion of the transportation
which was performed under the express
supervision of their own agent. It would
seem to have been inserted with reference
to such cases as required transportation
beyond the defendant's line. They were
upon their
certainly not "forwarders"
own route and while the goods were in
charge of their own servants, as was the
fact when the loss occurred in this case.
We think, therefore, that the court might,
with perfect propriety, have held that
the words had no application to transportation upon their own line, and consequently did not touch the present case.
3. But if they were susceptible of the
application given them by the court, in
favor of the carrier, as intended to reduce his responsibility, as an insurer, to
that of an ordinary agent, general or
special, which seems to us a far too liberal construction of the carrier's own
words, by which he now claims to secure his own exemption from the extreme common law responsibility, when
otnsr terms were far more natural and
more effective for any such purpose ; but,
admitting tbis construction is allowable,
still, we think, it cannot relieve the defendants, since it leaves them still responsible for ordinary care, diligence,
and skill, in the conduct of the business
of transportation. And this must extend, not only to themselves and their
particular servants, but to all the agencies employed by them, both animate and
inanimate. And although the owners

might have looked directly to these servants of the carrier and brought their
action against the steamboat company,
as in the case of New Jersey Steam Nav.
Co. v. Merchants' Bank, 6 How. U. S.
Rep. 344;
4. Still they were not obliged to do so.
This company were employed by the
carriers, as their servants, and they are
responsible for their faithfulness and
good conduct, as such, and there is nothing in the contract to throw this upon
the owner of the goods, or to shift his
claim for indemnity upon them. It is
at the election of the owners whether
they will pass over their immediate employees and call upon the general carrier
for indemnity. The English courts, as
we have before shown, ante, p. 11, will
not allow the owner of the goods to
maintain an action against any carrier
connected with the transportation, except those with whom his immediate
contract is made. But the American
rule gives the owner an election to call
upon any one connected with the transportation, for indemnity, to the extent of
the loss or damage sustained through his
particular default: ante, pp. 11, 12. And
we think this the more just and reasonable rule.
5. So thatupon everyground itwould
seem, the owners of the goods might
claim to recover, for a loss sustained
through the want of ordinary care in
those independent carriers employed by
the express company with whom they
contracted, since, if the restriction was
not properly applicable to such inde
pendent carriers, they would be responsible to the full extent, as insurers, and
the express company having assumed to
overlook the transportation, personally,
and to accept the whole price of transportation themselves, must be responsible
to the owners, for all defaults of independent carriers employed by them, and.
will in turn have a remedy over against
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such carriers. This may imply that the effective motives for faithful conduct,
ultimate carriers will, in some cases, be and such a contract would, therefore, be
against sound policy: it is equivalent to
allowing one to contract for license to
do an immoral or an unlawful act. The
license is void, and revocable at any time,
and the promised reward being the price
of an act contra bonos mores, is not enforceable in a court of justice : Redfield
on Railways, § 133, p. 5: llclfanus v.
LancashireRailway Co., 2 H. & N. 693;
s. c., 4 Id. 327. In this latter hearing,
before the Exchequer Chamber, the
opinion of the Court, of Exchequer was
reversed, and all such contracts as professed to excuse the carrier for the neglect of duty by his servants, were held
to be unreasonable and void under the
English statute 17 & 18 Vict. ch. 31, s.
7. See also Redfield on Railways, §
133, notes 9-17, and §§ 134, 140, and
from neglect of duty, in regard to pro- notes, where these questions are very
per care : New Jersey Steam Navigation extensively considered. In conclusion,
we must repeat, that we have been gratiCo. v. M!erchants' Bank, supra.
5. The same remark is true of the fied with the careful and unexceptionproposition, that a restrictive clause in able manner in which the principal case
the bill of lading or receipt, given by is studied and reasoned out, in all its
the carrier, will not be construed to bearings ; and, althoughwe have felt comexempt him from responsibility for loss pelled to declare our opinion, that the
occasioned by negligence in the agencies propositions stated in the opinion of the
employed by him, unless such intention court fall short of the ultimate truth upon
is very clearly expressed in such instrt- those points, they clearly cover the case,
ment; it comes short of the true rule and that is all the court could decide.
The better We do not like to make invidious comof law upon the subject.
opinion, we think, now is, that no person, parisons between the opinions of courts
natural or corporate, shall be allowed in different sections, but we must say, if
to stipulate for exemption from responsi- lawyers look at the decisions beyond
bility for his own negligence, because their own state, they should not overlook
I. F. R.
that removes one of the most direct and California.

liable to actions from more than one
party for the same dethult. But this is
true in all cases, where business is
transacted through the agency of others.
.,The action may always be brought in
the name of the agent, in whose name
the contract is made, or of the principal.
And in the latter case the defendant will
have the same right of set-off, and other
defences, as if the suit were brought in
the name of the agent with whom he
contracted : Lapham v. Green, 9 Vt. Rep.
407. And if, on the other hand, the
ultimate carriers are regarded as coming
within the fair construction of the restrictive clause in the receipt, then it
will not avail the defendants, for the
reason that it cannot properly be so constrned, as to cover defaults resulting
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Court of Appeals of NVew York.
JOHN H. MILLS et al. v. THE CITY OF BROOKLYN.,
A municipal corporation is not liable in a civil action, to a private property
owner, for failure to provide sufficient sewerage to drain his lot.
The public duty to provide sewerage and drainage for the city in the first
place, is quasijudicial, and the exercise of discretion as to the manner of performing it, is to be distinguished from a neglect of duty, by which a sewer is so badly
constructed or allowed to get so out of repair as to become a nuisance, for which
the corporation would be responsible.

-APPEAL from a judgment of the Supreme Court. The complaint sets forth that the plaintiffs were the owners of a lot, with a
brick dwelling-house thereon, situated at the north-west corner of
Franklin and Putnam avenues, in the city of Brooklyn; that the
defendant, the city corporation, had by law the care of the streets
and avenues, and the control of the leading sewerage and drainage of said streets and avenues, and it proceeds thus: "That the
defendants so negligently and unskilfully built, provided, and
established sewers at the corners of Franklin and Putnam avenues,
that said sewers are, and always have been, insufficient to conduct
and carry away properly the water that is brought to said corner
by the grade of Putnam and Franklin avenues and the streets
and avenues thereto adjacent ; and that said sewers are so negligently and unskllfully built that they fail to perform the office for
which they are and were constructed."
It is then stated that, by reason of the premises, the plaintiff's
lot and house have been repeatedly flooded with water, namely,
on certain days mentioned in Afarch and August 1861 and in
1862, causing the walls to settle and crack, and the building to
be otherwise greatly injured, for which damages are claimed to

the amount of $2500.
The defence takes issue upon the facts alleged.

On the triali before Mr. Justice Scrugham, in June 1863, it
appeared that the plaintiff's lot, at the intersection of the avenues
mentioned, was on low ground, forming a natural basin, into which
the water ran from all directions ; that formerly, before the forming and paving of the streets, it was absorbed by the earth,
I We are indebted for this case to the courtesy of J. G. Schumaker, Esq
ounsel of defendants.-ED. Am. L. R.
VoL. XIV.-3
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instead of remaining on the surface; that Franklin and Putnam
avenues are graded and paved according to the plan of the Common Council, and that the grade of these streets is higher than
the plaintiff's lot. In March 1861, and again in August of the
same year there were rain storms, the latter being a heavy one,
and, on both occasions, the plaintiff's premises were inundated.
The first time, there was about two feet of water in his cellar, and
the walls were cracked by settling. The second time, the water
was much deeper, and it caused the walls to settle and crack
badly, and the house was much injured. The house was a new
one, finished in 1860. There was a sewer or outlet for water
under the side-wall and the street prior to. the first storm,. and
after the storm in March and in the month of May following, the
Water Commissioners caused a pipe-drain earthen sewer to be
constructed in the street, about twelve inches in diameter; but it
proved insufficient to carry off the water as it came down. It
appeared tliat the sewer was built in consequence of a resolution
of the Common Council, adopted on the 18th of April 1861, by
the terms of which the Commissioners of Sewers were requested
to construct a temporary sewer at that place, pursuant to an act
of the legislature, passed on the 5th day of that month, which is
mentioned in the opinion.
On the part of the defendants, it was shown by the testimony
of an assistant engineer of the Water and Sewerage Commissioners, who constructed the sewer, that it was of stoneware pipe,
and was eighteen inches in diameter above the plaintiff's premises
and twelve inches below that point; that a larger sewer could not
be laid on that course, in consequence of the grade and dimensiofis
of the sewers with which they were obliged to connect it; that
if made larger it would have to be so near the surface of the
street that it could not have a sufficiently -thick covering, and,
moreover, it could not be larger than the corresponding sewer
below. After the August storm, an additional sewer was constructed at that point. The defendants also gave evidence showing that the walls and the house were very much injured by water
prior to the laying down of the temporary sewer in May 1861,
and also that the basement wall and the house was laid with
unsuitable mortar, it lacking the proper proportions of lime.
Considerable evidence was given upon the question of'damages.
The defendants, at the commencement of the trial, moved 9
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dismissal of the complaint, on the ground that it did not state
facts sufficient to establish a cause of action; and, after close of
the testimony, they made a like motion, on the ground that the
defendants were not responsible for the wall under the provision
of the statute on the subject of sewers, and on the ground that,
as the sewer was made as large as it could, be, no negligence
could be imputed to the defendants.
The motions were denied on each occasion when made, and the
defendants' counsel excepted.
The judge left the case to the jury, instructing them that the
plaintiffs were not entitled to recover for any injuries sustained
by them prior to the building the sewer in May 1861. The jury
, - tfound for the plaintiff damages $900.
After an affirmance at the General Term, this appeal was
brought by the defendants.
John G. Schumaker, for thb appellants.
David J Dean, for the respondents.
The opinion of the court was delivered by
DENIo, C. J.-Prior to the more recent legislation on the subject of sewerage in Brooklyn, the Common Council of that city
wrere clothed with the usual power to cause streets and avenues to
be opened and widened, regulated, graded and repaired, and to
cause sewers and drains, wells and pumps to be constructed and
repaired and the expense of such improvements was to be
assessed on the property benefited: Laws 1854, oh. 384, p. 860,
§ 1. A change was made in 1857, -by which the whole subject
of sewerage and drainage was committed to the Board of Water
Commissionero, who were constituted Sewerage' Commissioners,
and were to devise and frame a plan of draimage and sewerage,
and were to construct such of the drains and sewers therein
adopted as the public health, convenience, or interest should
demand, or so Equch thereof as should be necessary: Laws 1857,
ch. 521, § 5, p. 100. This Act was amended in 1859, and some
provisions added not material to'the present question (ch. 385).
In April 1861, some four months before the injury happened for
which the recovery in this case was had, another Act was passed,
under which the sewer in controversy was constructed. It provides
that whenever it shall 'become necessary to construct a sewer or
drain in any street or avenue for the purpose of preventing damage
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to property, or to abate a nuisance, and it shall have become im.
practicable to proceed immediately to the construction of the same,
in accordance with any plan already adopted by the Sewer Commissioners of the city of Brooklyn, in the drainage district in
which such streets are situated by reason of any street therein
not having been graded, therefore, at the request of the Common
Council of said city, the Sewer Commissioners shall have power
to construct a temporary sewer in such manner as to avoid such
damage or abate such nuisance; and the cost of such temporary
sewer or drain shall be assessed upon the property draining into
the same and benefited thereby, &c.: Laws 1861, ch. 136, § 6,
p. 257.
The defendants' counsel made a point that the city is not
responsible for any delinquency respecting the sewer in question,
because it was not shown that the case had occurred which conferred upon the Council the authority to construct a temporary
sewer. It is true it was not shown what streets the sewerage district in which the plaintiff's premises were situated embraced,
or whether there were any streets therein -which had not been
graded ; and the -existence of ungraded streets in the sewerage
district seems to have been necessary to empower the common
council to proceed under the act. That body did, however,
assume that a case for the exercise of its jurisdiction had arisen,
and accordingly adopted a resolution for the construction of a
temporary sewer. If showing of a want of power would have
been a defence, the burthen of proof rested on the defendants.
The authority of the Council depended upon matter of fact, at
least as fully within its knowledge as that of the plaintiffs. They
assumed that the requisite fact existed, and proceeded accordmgly. In the absence of any evidence on the subject, we must
assume that a case had arisen upon which their power attached,
and that the corporation is fully concluded by their acts.
But a more important question arises, Whether, upon the case
made by the complaint and the evidence, a private action will lie
against the city corporation for the injury which the plaintiff has
sustained ? In the examination of the question, I have assumed
that the city is responsible for the delinquencies of the Board of
Sewer Commissioners yto the same extent which they would have
been if the subject of sewerage had remained where it was placed
by the Act of 1854. I do not suppose that the committing of the
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subject to an administrative board, though done pursuant to an
act of the legislature, alters the relation which the city, as a
municipal corporation, bears to the subject. That view has not
been urged by the defendants' counsel, and I have not examined
it with much attention, having come to a conclusion which renders
its determination unnecessary.
The grievance of which the plaintiffs complain is that sufficient
sewerage to carry off the surface-water from their lot and house
has not been provided. A sewer of a certain capacity was built,
but it was insufficient to carry off all the water which came down
in a rain-storm, and the plaintiff's premises were to a certain
extent unprotected. Their condition was certainly no worse than
it would have been if no sewer at all had been constructed. So
far as the one laid down operated, it relieved the plaintiff's lot,
but the relief was not adequate. If the defendants would have
been liable if they had done nothing, they are of course liable
for the insufficient character of the work which was constructed.
But it is not the law that a municipal corporation is responsible
in a private action for not providing sufficient sewerage for every
or for any part of the city. The duty of draining the streets
and avenues of a city or village is one requiring the exercise of
deliberation, judgment, and discretion. It cannot, in the nature
of tflings, be so executed that in a single moment, every square
foot of the surface shall be perfectly protected against the consequence of water falling from the clouds upon it. This duty is
not, in a technical sense, a judicial one, for it does not concur in
the administration of justice between citizens ; but it is of a judicial nature, for it requires, as I have said, the same qualities of
deliberation and judgment. It admits of a choice of means and
the determination of the order of time in which improvement shall
be made. It involves also a variety of prudential considerations
relating to the burdens which may be discreetly imposed at a
given time, and the preference which one locality may claim over
another.
If the owner of property may prosecute the corporation on the
ground that sufficient sewerage has not been provided for his
premises, all these questions must be determined by a jury, and
thus the jurisdiction which the law has committed to the City
Council or to an administrative board, will have to be executed by
the judicial tribunals. The court and jury would have to act
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upon a partial view of the question, for it would be impossible
that all the varied considerations which might bear upon it could
be brought to their attention in the course of a single trial. Such
a system of law would be as vexatious in practice as it is unwarranted in law. It has been frequently invoked, but never, I
believe, with success.
The subject of constructing sewers is of the same general character as that of laying out, grading, or paving streets. Persons
may differ as to whether a street ought to be pitched or paved at
a particular time, and as to the grade which should be established
if it is done. In Wilson v. The Mayor, &c., of New York, 1
Denio 595, an action was brought against the corporation for
grading the streets running on two sides of the plaintiff's lots,
without making a sufficient drain to carry off the water, which
was thus thrown upon these lots. The plaintiff was nonsuited,
and the question was brought before the Supreme Court, which
sustained the ruling. The opinion pronounced by the late Judge
BEARDSLEY explains the law on this point in a very satisfactory
manner. He shows, in the first place, that the city corporation
had an undoubted right to form the grade of the streets and
sewers; and that if inconvenience or damage may be occasioned
to persons whose land was not actually taken, it was an injury
which they were bound to submit to for the common good, uider
the maxim " salu s populi suprerna est lex."
As to the grievance that sewers had not been made to carry off
the water which the raising of the streets had thrown upon the
plaintiff's lots, the remarks of this able judge are so just in themselves, and withal so applicable to the present case, that I will
repeat them as expressive of my own views. He says, "1A drain
from the plaintiff's lots was claimed to have been necessary and
proper, and the declaration alleges that it was the defendant's
duty to have made one; and as none was made, the conclusion is
drawn that they are responsible to the plaintiff for all the damages which resulted from the want of a proper drain. This
alleged grdund of action seems to me totally unprecedented, and,
in my judgment, can be sustained on no principle whatever. The
error has arisen from confounding power and duties which are
totally dissimilar. Public officers of every grade and description
may be impeached or indicted for official misconduct or corruptiou. To this there is no exception from the highest to the lowest.
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But the civil remedy for misconduct in office is more restricted,
and depends exclusively upon the nature of the duty which has
been violated. But where that is absolute, certain, and imperative, and every mere ministerial duty is so, the delinquent officer
is bound to make full redress to every person who has suffered by
such delinquency. Duties which are purely ministerial in their
nature are sometimes cast upon officers whose chief functions are
judicial. Where this occurs, and the ministerial duty is violated,
the officer, although for most purposes a judge, is still civilly
responsible for such misconduct. But 'where the duty alleged to
have been violated is purely judicial, a different rule prevails ; for
no action lies in any case for misconduct or delinquency, however
gross, in the performance of judicial duties. And although the
officer may not in strictness be a judge, still, if his powers are discretionary, to be exerted or withheld, according to his own view
of what is necessary and proper, they are in their nature judicial,.
and he is exempt from all responsibility, by action, for the motives
which influence him to the manner in which such duties are performed. If corrupt, he may be impeached or indicted, but the
law will not tolerate an action to redress the individual wrong
which may have been done." This case, which is a leading one
on this class of questions, has repeatedly come under the consideration of the present Supreme Court and of this Court, and has
always been referred to as an accurate exposition of the law:
Cole v. The Trustees of Medina, 27 Barb. 218; Kavanagh v.
The City of Brooklyn, 88 Id. 232; The Roehester White Lead
Co. v. The City of Rochester, 3 Comstock 463; Hfutson v. The
Mayor, &e., of .New York, 5 Seld. 163. It is not necessary to
show that the principle thus admitted has always been correctly
applied, though I am not ready to affirm that any material mistake in that respect has ever been made. In the first two of these
cases the plaintiffs were defeated upon the principle above mentioned, and the judgment was sustained in very instructive opinions
prepared by Judge MARVIx and Judge BROWN.
It may therefore be laid down as a very clear proposition, that
if no sewer had been constructed at the locality referred to, an
action would not lie against the corporation, though the jury should
find that one was necessary, and that the defendants were guilty
of a dereliction of duty in not having constructed one.
But the defendants put down a sewer which was insufficient to
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carry off all the surface-water which fell during a violent shower.
There was no want of skill in constructing it; simply it was not
sufficiently large. The evidence was, that it could not have been
made larger on account of the grade and size of the system of
sewers with which it connected, and through which the water had
to be carried off. The evidence as to this was entirely uncontradicted, and there was nothing intrinsically improbable in the
assertion ; and unless the defendants were responsible for the want
of judgment upon which that system was devised, I do not see
why this evidence was not a complete answer to the action; and
that they were not responsible for that error, if it was one, follows
from what has already been said. Very many considerations
beside the protection of the land upon which the plaintiff's house
was erected, no doubt entered into the question when that system
was determined upon. It is inferrible from the evidence, that the
plaintiff's land was then vacant and unimproved, and that the
adjacent streets had not been graded; while that state of things
existed it seems that the surface-water was absorbed by the earth and
injured no one. No doubt public improvement, in a growing town,
ought to be made with a certain reference to anticipated change.
But it would require a degree of wisdom and foresight not usually
met with in public officers, to adjust and apply the expenditures
for public purposes so perfectly that no deficiency or redundancy
could ever be found to exist. It is a wise provision of the law
that an action for damages does not lie on such errors of judgment on the part of the agents of the public.
Certain cases are relied on by the plaintiff's counsel for the
position, that as the Common Council determined to construct a
sewer at the point indicated, and entered upon the wall, the city
is liable for damages because it proved insufficient for the object
for which it was intended. But they fall far short of establishing
that doctrine. In The .Mayor,&c., v. Furze, 3 Hill 612, certain culverts, sewers, and basins which had been constructed by
the corporation of New York, had been suffered to be out of
repair, on account of which the plaintiff's premises were overflowed, and the plaintiff recovered a verdict which was sustained.
The judgment was placed upon the ground that it was the duty
of the corporation to preserve and keep in repair erections which
they had themselves constructed, so that they should not become
a source of nuisance to the adjacent property. There are certain
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observations in the opinion which would go beyond that principle;
but they were conceded by the judge who delivered it not to be
necessary to the judgment, and they are expressly disapproved of
in the subsequent case of Wilson v. The .Jayor, &.c., just
referred to, and in several other cases, and have never since been
acted on. In The Bochester 1TVite Lead Company v. The City
of Bochester, already mentioned, a natural stream of water was
intersected by a city street, and the stream was conducted under
it by a culvert which seems to have been sufficient for its passage;
but some years afterward the position of this culvert was changed
to a point under the street more than one hundred feet from its
original place, and was so badly constructed by an incompetent
engineer, with rough stones and with certain angles in its course,
that the water would not run off freely, and the plaintiff's manufactory for white lead was overflowed and his property injured.
The plaintiffs had a verdict and judgment which was sustained in
this court. It was held that the duty in that case was ministerial, and that the duty and obligation to make the change in a
proper and safe manner, if made at all, was absolute. The corporation was dealing with a work of their own construction, and
certainly no more justified in making a change which would
defeat its purpose than they would have been to suffer it to
become a nuisance by being out of repair.
The cases of Barton v. The City of Syracuse, 37 1Barb. 292;
Hfutson v. The Miayor of New York, supra; Conrad v. The
Trustees of the VFillage of Ithaca, 16 N. Y, 158; West v. The
Trustees of Lockport, in a note to the last case, and Lacour v.
The Mayor, &c., of New York, 3 Duer 406, are all cases where
the injury was either the result of suffering a municipal work to be
out of repair, or where the defendants had done acts which were in
themselves positive nuisances. They furnish no ground for holding a municipal corporation responsible for not providing suitable
sewerage, whether the neglect was total or partial, only arising
from the insufficiency of a sewer to discharge all the water which
it was intended to carry off.
The questions in tis case were raised by the motion to dismiss
on account of the insufficiency of the complaint, which did not,
according to the foregoing views, set forth a cause of action, and
by one of the points taken at the close of the trial.

MILLS v. CITY OF BROOKLYN.

I am in favor of reversing the judgment of the Supreme Court,
and ordering a new trial.
CAMPBELL, J.,

dissented.

I. How far a municipal corporation,
acting under its lawful and undisputed
powers, such as the laying out, opening,
and grading of streets, &c., may be
liable for consequential damages to property-owners, has within the last few
So
years been extensively discussed.
far as private property is taken for public use, the rights of the owners are protected under the provisions of all the
state constitutions in regard to such taking; but there are numerous cases in
which no property was actually taken
for public use, and yet substantial damage resulted to individuals from the progress of changes made for the public
benefit and by the public authorities, and
for this damage the owners have sought
to recover compensation under the constitutional protection referred to. With
the exception, however, of some cases in
the state of Ohio, which will be noticed
presently, the decisions have been uniformly against the right to recover, the
provision in the constitution being held
to refer only to a taking of property, and
any damage merely consequential from a
lawful action being damnum absque injuria. Thus, in Pennsylvania, Green v.
Borough ofReading, 9 Watts 382, whereit
was first held that a municipal corporation is not liable for damages caused by
the opening of a street; Mayor v. Randolph, 4 W. & S. 514, where it is said,
that the motives of the corporation are
not the subject of inquiry, and it is not
liable, therefore, though its motives may
have been merely to benefit its private
property; and O'Connor v. City of Pittsburgh, 6 Harris (18 Penn. State flep.)
187, where the city was held not liable
for damage from the change of grade
of a street, though the building was conformed to the grade previously estab-

lished by law. So in New Jersey, City
of Camden v. Mulford, 2 Dutcher 49;
Delaware, Clark v. City of Wilmington,
5 Harrington 243; Michigan, Dermont
v. Mayor, 6-c., Detroit, 4 Mich. 435;
Missouri, Gurno v. City of St. Louis, 12
Mo. 414; Taylor et al. v. St. Louis, 14
Id. 20; Lambar v. City of St. Louis,
15 Id. 610; and Mississippi, White et
ux. v. Corporation of Yazoo City, 27
Miss. 357.
In Ohio, however, it was held in
Rhodes v. City of Cleveland, 10 Ohio
159, that municipal corporations are liable, in the same manner as individuals,
for injuries done, although the act be not
beyond their legal powers. And in
McCombs v. Town Council of Akron, 15
Ohio 476, the court went further. The
plaintiff's house stood higher than the
street grade as adopted by the Town
Council, and by the cutting down of the
street his house was injured, without any
fault of the Council or their agents in
performing the work. The court, basing
its decision on the broad ground ofjustice,
that he should receive compensation for
an undeniable injury, avowedly went
beyond precedents, and permitted the
plaintiff to recover. BRiCHARD, J., dissented, and delivered an opinion showing
very clearly that a private person would
not be liable on the same state of facts,
and that the decision was going far beyond what was called for by the case of
Rhodes v. Cleveland. 'The court, however, adhered to its decision on second
hearing: Akron v. fcCombs, 18 Ohio
229: and the decision was afterwards
affirmed in City of Dayton v. Pease, 4
Ohio, N. S. 80.
II. The basis of the decision in the
foregoing cases, that the corporation is
not liable, is. that the duties involved
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are discretionary and quasi judicial, and of Camden v. Jlfuford, 2 Dutcher (N. J.)
wherever they partake of that character, 49; and Dermont v. Mayor, 6-c., of De.
the party to whom such discretion is troit, 4 Mich. 435.
From this distinction it follows that,
committed by the sovereign authority, is
exempt from question as to the man- while a municipal corporation is not
ner of exercising it, and from liabil- compellable by a civil action for damity for the results that flow therefrom. ages, to exercise its discretion in any
If the exercise of the corporation's judg- particular manner, or at all in any parment in a particular case could be ques- ticular case, yet, when it has decided,
tioned in an action at law, the result and undertaken a work, it is to be
would he ultimately to remove the dis- held to the same rule of carefulness and
cretionary power from the corporation skill in the performance of it as a private
and put it into the hands of the court individual; and there are numerous cases,
and jury, a result clearly shown and de- accordingly, in which damages have been
precated in the principal case, and also allowed to be recovered against such
in the almost identical case of Carr et corporations. See, in addition to case;
al. v. Northern Liberties, 11 Casey (35 already cited, Dean v. .Niv o31ilford
'Township, 5 W. & S.545; ( ommissioners
Penn. State Rep.) 329.
The precise point, therefore, at which of Kensington v. Mod, 10 Barr (Penn.
municipal duties cease to be discretionary State) 93 ; Pittsburghv. Grier, 10 Haror quasi judicial, and become merely ris (22 Penn. State) 54 ; Brie City v.
ministerial, is of grcat importance, and Schwingle, Id. 384; Shuter v. City, 3
has been much discussed, especially in Phila. Rep. 228 ; Ross v. City of M1fadithe state of New York. It is thus ex- son, 1 Carter (Ind.) 281. And the dispressed by SLossox, J., in Laceour v. tinction thus indicated has been adhered
Mayor, 6-c., of New York, 3 Duer 406: to with great unanimity wherever the
"A public officer is not amenable to an question has arisen, unless it be in the
individual in a civil action for the exer- case of The .3fayor, 6-c., of Baltimore v.
cise, or the refusal or neglect to exercise JMrarriott, 9 Md. 160. In that case the
a judicial duty, but the moment the duty plaintiff, in passing over a pavement
ceases to be of this character, which it covered with ice, fell and was injured,
does when the election to perform it is and brought an action against the city
made, this immunity also ceases. The for damages. There was some evidence
execution of the work itself is purely that the pavement had been allowed to
ministerial, and thenceforth the public remain covered with ice for a consideraofficer is liable in damages for the im- ble time, and the recovery, therefore,
proper or negligent exercise of the duty." might have been allowed on the ground
On this subject, see also in addition to of negligence of the city in enforcing its
the cases cited in the principal case, ordinances for cleaning pavements, hut
Lloyd v. Mayor, 6-c., of New York, I the court declared that the action would
Sold. 375 ; Radcliff'2SExecutors v. 3ayeor lie because the city charter contained a
of Brooklyn, 4 Comst. 195; Bailey v. provision that the corporation "shall
Mayor, 6-c., of New York, 3 Hill 531 ; have full power and authority, to enact
s. c. on review, 2 Denio 433; Hickok v. and pass all laws * * * and to prevent
Trustees of Plattsburg, 15 Barb. 427 ; and remove nuisances." This, it was
Barton v. City of Syracuse, 37 Id. 292; held, was not discretionary but imperaKavanagh v. City of Brooklyn, 38 Id. tive, and the words "power and autho232; Carr v. Northern Liberties, 11 rity," meant "duty and obligation,"
Casey (35 Penn. State Rep.) 324; City which were enforceable by a private

N. W. IRON CO. v. HOPKINS.
action for damages.

In this view of the appears to have been the view taken by

case, it would appear to be an exception the judge who tried it in the court below.
But the cardinal fact in the evidence, as
to the general current of authorities.
III. In the principal case, the declara- reviewed by the Chief Justice in the Aption averred that the drain in question pellate Court, was, that the construction
was negligently and unskilfully built, of the drain did not put the plaintiff in
being entirely inadequate for the purpose any worse position than he was in before it
It was a temporary drain was made. On the contrary, though not
designed.
merely, and it appears not to have been a perfect protection, the drain was,
denied, that it was of insufficient size to nevertheless, a benefit so far as it opercarry off the water from such storms as ated at all, and therefore, unless the
might be frequently expected to occur. defendants would have been liable for
It may, therefore, be, regarded in one not making any drain, they were not
view as a negligent performance of duty liable for making an insufficient one.
by the corporation, who, though not If on a new trial, the fact should appear
bound to make a sewer there, were to be otherwise, the plaintiff might still
bound to make a good one f they made recover without in any degree impeachany at all. The case therefore would ing the rules of law so clearly and satiscome within the class already noticed, factorily laid down by the Chief Justice
where the corporation is liable, and this in the foregoing opinion. J. T. M.

In Circuit Court of the United States, for the Northern -District
of 171inois.
NORTH-WESTERN IRON COMPANY v. JOHN W. HOPKINS et al.
A libel for review, filed aft6r the term has passed at which the decree complained
of was rendered, and after the same has been executed, will be entertained by a
court of admiralty, when actual fraud is charged and the libellant is without fault
and without remedy.

DAvis, J.-This libel presents this question: Has a court of
admiralty a right to entertain a libel for review after the term
has passed, and after the decree has been executed ?
The right is denied, and chiefly on the ground of a want of
precedent. The authority of precedent is very strong, but not
always conclusive. I can perceive no good reason why a court
of admiralty, in a proper case, should not exercise the power of
reviewing its own proceedings. It may be necessary for the
proper administration of justice, and especially in cases where
important rights are adjudicated without personal notice, which is
permitted under our rules. The court would not entertain a libel
on the grounds of mere oversight or neglect. But, where actual
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fraud is charged, and the libellant is without fault and without
remedy, it would be a denial of justice to dismiss it.
Lord STOWELL and Justices STORY and SPRAGUE all thought
that there were cases in which libels for review should be retained,
although conceding the absence of precedent.
Judge STORY said that "where, by after-acquired evidence, it
was plain that the merits had not been considered, it was right to
entertain a bill for review."
The remedy by Ebel for review, in the case before the court, is
a proper one, and the demurrer is overruled.
The cases containing the opinions of
With these cases compare The MonLord STOWELL and Justices STORY and arch, Bell, 1 Win. Rob. 21 ; 2 Conk.
SPRAGUE, referred to, are The Fortitudo, Adm. (2d ed) 360-367 ; The Martha, 1
2 Dors. 70; The Steamboat New Eng- Blatch. & How. 171-175.
land, 3 Sumner 506; and Janvrin v.
J. A. J.
Smith, Sprague's Decisions 13.

District Court of tite Uniited States for the Northern District
of New York. In Admiralty.
RICHARD WELLS COUNCER v. THE STEAM-TUG "A. L. GRIFFIN," &c.
A libel for the loss of a vessel on the Canadian shore of Niagara river, having been referred to a master, he reported that at the time of the loss the vessel
wasworth a certain sumof "dollars in gold, or Canadian currency,I and that gold
or Canadian currency was, at such time, at a premium of forty-nine per cent. over
United States legal tender notes. Held, that the value being reported at a certain
sum in foreign currency, the damages were to be estimated at the value of that sum
in United States notes, and the use of the word " gold" in connection with Canadian currency did not require any different rule than would have been applied had
the value been stated in the foreign currency only.

THIS suit was brought to recover the damages sustained by the
libellant in the loss of the scow 1 Andrew Murray," on the
Niagara river, at the mouth of Chippewa creek, in Canada West,
on the 14th day of December 1863.
After the hearing, upon pleadings and proofs, an interlocutory
decree was made, referring it to a commissioner "to take the
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necessary proofs, and report the amount of damage which the
libellant had sustained by reason of the loss of his scow," &c. In
pursuance of such decree of reference, the Commissioner reported
"that on the 14th day of December, 1863,-on which day the
said scow ' Andrew Murray' was lost,--she, the said scow ' Andrew Murray,' was worth, including equipments, at Chippewa,
the sum of nine hundred and fifty dollars in gold, or Canadian
currency, and that the interest on nine hundred and fifty dollars
from the 14th day of December, 1863, to and including the date
of this report, is the sum of forty dollars and forty-three cents,"
and also "that on the 14th day of December, 1863, gold, or Canadian currency, was at a premium in the city of Buffalo of fortynine per cent. over United States legal tender notes." The Commissioner's report was dated on the 24th day of July last.
Upon the coming in of this report, it was insisted by the counsel for the libellant that in estimating the damages of the libellant,
the forty-nine per cent. reported by the Commissioner as the difference between Canadian currency and United States legal tender
notes should be added to the value of the property lost, and the
interest on that value as reported by the Commissioner; while the
counsel for the respondent insisted that, by the Act of Congress,
the dollar of the U. S. legal tender note was in law the exact
equivalent of the gold dollar, and that therefore the premium
reported and claimed could not be allowed.
G. B. Hibbard,for libellant.
A. P. Nichols; for respondent.
The opinion of the court was delivered by
HALL, D. J.-The Commissioner has reported the value of the
property lost, and not the amount of the libellant's damages; and
the value thus reported he states to be the value in Canadian currency or gold, at the time and place of the loss-that is, at the
mouth of Chippewa creek, in Canada, in December, 1863. The
report also shows, or rather assumes, that Canadian currency and
gold were of equal value; and states that both then bore a premium .of 49 per cent. in this city. The report shows in substance
that the value of the scow, at the time and place of the loss, was
$950, in the currency of Canada, and that the dollar of Canadian
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currency was then worth $1.49 in the currency which then was
and now is the universal if not the legal standard of value in the
United States.
Whether this currency is or is not the present legal standard
of value it is not necessary now to inquire, for the counsel for the
libellant and the counsel for the respondent alike assumed, as the
basis of their respective arguments, that the decree in this case
might be legally paid in the United States legal-tender notes, and
that the libellant could not require its payment in the gold and silver
coins which formerly constituted the only legal-tender money of
the United States. Consensusfacit legem.
Assuming, then, that the decree in this case may be discharged
by the actual offer, in proper form, of United States legal-tender
notes in payment, the question is how, upon the Commissioner's
report, the damages of the libellant are to be computed 2 In thus
stating the question I intend to avoid the discussion, in detail, of
the several exceptions taken to the Commissioner's report, for
such exceptions relate, in form at least, to that portion of the
report which states the value of the libellant's scow at the time
and place of loss, and not to the fact that the Commissioner has
bot reported, in direct terms, the amount of the libellant's damages.
The report does not state the actual damages of the libellant,
but simply furnishes the data upon which those damages can be
computed, according to the rule of damages or computation which
may be adopted by the Court.
It assumes that the proper measure of damages for the loss
referred to, is the actual value of the property lost at the time
and place of the loss, with legal interest, and then states that
value in Canadian currency, and computes interest thereon. The
use of the word " gold" in connection with " Canadian currency,"
although the American gold dollar may in fact have been in the
contemplation of the Commissioner, does not require that any
effect should be* given to the report, which would not have been
required if the value had been stated in " Canadian currency"

only.
Canadian currency is d foreign currency; and though the
Canadians use the term dollar as the designation of the unit of
their currency, as we do in reference to our own currency. it does
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not legally or necessarily follow that their dollar is the equivalent
of ours. In fact the report shows that one hundred dollars of
their currency was, at the time of the loss, of the value of one
hundred and forty-nine dollars of ours ; and therefore to indemnify the libellant for his loss by a payment in our currency, it is
-necessary to give him one hundred and forty-nine dollars of such
currency for every one hundred dollars of the value of his property estimated in the currency of Canada.
Much of the appearance of difficulty, which at the hearing cast
doubt upon this question, is undoubtedly due to the fact that the
currency of Canada, like that of the United States, is a decimal
currency, with the dollar as a unit; and, that the coined dollar of
the two governments is supposed to be of equal value.
Whether it is so or not is not a question of law, but of fact,
and the question under consideration must be decided upon the
principles which would have governed it, if the loss had occurred
in Bordeaux or Odessa, and the value of the property lost, at the
time and place of loss, had been reported in francs or rubles.
That the loss occurred within a mile of the line dividing the United
States and Canada, and that values are expressed in dollars and
cents there as well as here, can make no difference in the principles of law applicable to the case; and if we look at the equities
of the case, it must be apparent that the legal rule is the equitable
one. If the loss had occurred at Schlosser, instead of at Chippewa, on the opposite shore, the damages to be recovered would
have been determined by the value of the scow and her equipments at Schlosser, in the currency of the United States; and
certainly there can be no equity iii adopting a different rule, and
taking from the libellant nearly one-third the sum necessary to be
paid for his actual indemnity, simply because the loss occurred
near the opposite side of the river.
If the loss had occurred in Russia, and the proof had shown
the value of the property in rubles, at the time and place of the
loss, it would hardly have been claimed, against the general current of authority, that the libellant would not be entitled to a
decree for the actual value here, in the existing American currency, of the number of rubles which his vessel was worth in
Russia, and the amount. of damages in this case must be computed upon the same principles: Story's Conflict of Laws, §§ 807,
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314 ; Story on Promissory Notes, §890, note 1; Parsons on Bills
and Notes 648.1
A decree in accordance with this opinion will be entered.
Affirmed by Mr. Justice NELSON, on appeal, August 1865.
See the case of The Ship Rochamnbeau,
26 Boston Law Reporter, p. 564, in
which Judge WARE, of the District Court
of Maine, held that a seaman shipped on
board of an American ship at St. John's,
New Brunswick, for a voyage to London

and back, and afterwards serving on
board under such contract, might rccover,
in the United States, double his stipulated wages ; gold then being at a promium of 100 per cent.

Supreme Court of Pennsylvania.
THE NORTH PENNSYLVANIA RAILROAD CO. v. CHARLES
REHAIAN.
A railroad company has the exclusive right of way along its track, and, in
Pennsylvania, is not bound to provide fences to keep out cattle.
Hence, if domestic animals wander on the track, whether -with or without the
owner's knowledge, and are killed without wantonness or gross negligence of the
railroad company, the latter will not be responsible in damages for their deathThe fact that the point where they were killed was at the intersection of the railroad with a public highway does not change the rule. A highway is public tor
purposes of travel only, and cattle wandering unattended are not within the class
to whose protection the railroad company is bound to look in crossing.
WRIT

of error to the District Court of Philadelphia.

Morton P. Henry, for plaintiffs in error.
R. .P. White, for defendant in error.

The opinion of the court was delivered by
THompsoN, J.-It was conceded on argument that the law is
settled in this state, that if cattle are suffered to run at large, and
are injured or killed on the track of a railroad, without wantonness, or such gross negligence as might amount to the same thing,
the owner has no recourse against the company or its servants:
.ailroad Company v. Skinner, 7 Harris 298.
Two elements are said to exist in this case, which it is supposed
modify, or perhaps render inapplicable altogether, the rule of
that case, so far as it is concerned, namely that the mules in
YoL. XIV.-4
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question were not turned out to roam at large, but were put into
a field with a good fence around it, on the evening previously to
being killed, and escaped thence without the knowledge of the
plaintiff; and secondly, that when they were struck by the defendants' engine they were on the crossing of the public road over the
railroad.
Do these elements distinguish the case in principle from
Skinner's Case ? I do not think they do. It is asserted in that
case in the clearest terms, without exception or limitation, in
regard to the crossing of roads or streets, that cattle roaming on
the track of a railroad are trespassing as regards the company,
and if they were killed without wantonness or gross carelessness
the company is not to be answerable for the loss. Chief Justice
GIBSONT said: "The company is a purchaser, in consideration of
public accommodation and convenience, of the exclusive possession of the ground paid for to the proprietors of it, and of a
license to use the greatest attainable rate of speed, with which
neither the person nor property of another may interfere." This
was a well-considered case; the doctrine is announced as of general application, and as such it has been generally accepted by the
people, who have long since, in the neighborhoods of railroads,
especially in the thickly-settled parts of the state, endeavored to
conform to it. It was undoubtedly by the application of the
common law rule, which requires the owners of cattle to restrain
them from trespassing at their peril, that this conclusion was
reached. That this is the rule, see Dovaston v. Payne, 2 H.
Bl. Rep. 527 ; 12 Eng. Law & Eq. Rep. 520, in note; 25 Id.
373; Shelford on Railways 470, note 1; 5 Comstock 849; 4
N. H. Rep. 36, 512.
It is true, by custom in Pennsylvania, owners of cattle are not
liable to be sued for trespass on account of cattle roaming on
unenclosed wood or waste lands. But to permit such roaming is
hardly a right; it is a privilege or immunity rather, growing out
of the inappreciable damage that would be done: Railroad v.
Skinner, supra, and Knight v. Alert, 6 Barr 492. The maxim
de minimis, in this particular, controls to avoid vexatious suits.
In trespass the rule undoubtedly is, that intent or ignorance is
no defence. It does not condone the injury. Whether the
damage be great or small, it is the unauthorized act which creates
the liability; the damage is but an incident of the wrong. In
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harmony with this idea is the common law requirement, that every
one must exercise his rights and privileges so as not to injure
others. Hence animals which have the propensity to trespass by
breaking into enclosures must be restrained at the peril of paying
for their trespass by their duress: -Dolph v. Terris, 7 W. & S.
367.
It is settled with us beyond doubt, that railroad companies are
not bound to fence against cattle; and by the decision already
cited, and many others, that such companies have, and it is necessary to their existence that they should have, the complete and
exclusive possession and entire control of their tracks, and entitled, as against anybody and everything not lawfully on their
road, to a clear track. It is quite apparent if they are not obliged
to fence against roaming cattle, that they are at the mercy of the
public, unless the law will protect them. Railroad tracks are
neither woodlands nor waste fields, and are not within the usage
as to roaming cattle on such land. The common law steps in to
protect the road, and to protect those upon it, and, as in Skinner's
Case, declares vagrant cattle upon it as trespassers. There are
many authorities to this effect in England and in this country, but
a few only will be referred to: 2 Eng. Law & Eq. 289; Tona-

wanda Railroad Company v. Munger, 4 Comst. 849; Perkins
v. Eastern Railroad Company, 29 Me. 307 ; Shelf. on Railways
507 ; 2 N. Jersey 185; Avery v. Maxwell, 4 N. H. 86; Mills
& Stark, Id. 514; Tewksbury v. Bujklin, 7 Id. 518. And it
is also expressly laid down in many authorities that where no
requisitions to fence exist, such companies are governed by the
rule of the common law. In addition to the cases just cited, in
which is contained this doctrine, see also 1 Amer. Railway Cases
144, 212, 213, and note. Indeed the result is inevitable. A
railroad in this state could not coexist with the preservation of
the usage to its full extent. Their speed would be destroyed in
their attempts to keep the track clear, and the lives of passengers
put in jeopardy tonstantly, if they should disregard such precaution, as well as being subjected to what it would cost to pay for
cattle killed or injured in case of disregarding it.
Whether, therefore, the plaintiff's mules escaped from ar.
enclosed field or not, in view of the trespass on the defendants'
road, I do not think makes any difference in this case. It was
undisputed that they were on the defendants' road without its
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license. If so, they were there wrongfully-wero trespassers.
How can the owner separate his case from the wrong done by his
cattle ? Intention, nay, effort to prevent, will not make their
occupancy of the track of the road lawful. If they were in fault
it was because their owner was in fault in not restraining them.
He was bound to do it at his peril. He did not restrain them so
as to prevent them being in the way of the defendants, and I see
not how he can lawfully demand compensation, in such an aspect
of the case, without a repudiation of the axiom, that where there
is mutual fault or negligence neither party can recover from the
other. The case of Knight v. Abert, 6 Barr 472, illustrates this
idea. The plaintiff's cattle were wandering on the woodlands of
the defendant; one of them fell into an ore-pit and was killed.
The owner charged negligence on the defendant for leaving it
open, and the defendant replied that his cattle were trespassing,
and he was not bound to take care of them, or to run the risk of
injury if they came on his place without leave. This was held to
be a good defence, GIBSON, 0. J., saying: "He who suffers his
cattle to go at large, takes upon himself the risks incident to it."
So we think in this case the risk was on the plaintiff, and if his
cattle were not killed in wantonness or by gross neglect he must
abide the law. There was not a particle of evidence of this in
the case.
These views we think meet the first aspect of the case ; but it
was insisted in argument that the mules were on the common
highway, at the point where it crosses the railroad, when they
were killed by the defendants' engine and train, and therefore not
trespassing. Highways are established to accommodate travel
alone, and it can hardly be that unattended and loitering cattle
are within the class. True, they may not be taken up as strays
because on the highway ; nor the owner sued for trespass for that
reason alone; but unreasoning and dumb, it is absurd to think of
them in reference to rules governing the enjoyment of the easement of passing and repassing on a highway, among which is the
duty to take care of the rights of others and their own safety.
Such being the case, as a general thing, it is negligence to permit
them to wander where they may do, as well as receive, injury.
This subject has received judicial notice in more than one case.
In Dovaston v. -Payne,already referred to, it was held in a plea
in bar of an avowry for taking cattle damage feasant, that the
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cattle escaped from a public highway into the locus in quo,
through a defect in the fences, must show that they were passing
along the highway when they escaped, and that it was not sufficient to aver that "being on the highway they escaped." BULLR,
J., said, whether the plaintiff was a trespasser or not depends on
the fact whether he was "passing or repassing and using the road
as a highway, or whether his cattle were in the road as trespassers ;" and that it was fatal to the plea to omit the averment
of passing on the highway at the time of the escape into the
defendant's close.
So in 4 Ellis & Black. 860, it was held that a person was
rightly convicted of trespass under the statute ef 1 & 2 W. 4,
in regard to game, although he was in the highway when he fired
at the bird as it flew over it. The ruling was, that as the evidence
showed that the defendant was not in the road in the exercise of
the right of way, but for another purpose, viz., in search of game,
he was a trespasser on the lands of the adjoining owner through
whose lands the road lay, and over which the public had only an
easement for the purposes of travel.
In Avery v. Naxwell, 4 N. H. 36, cited supra for another
purpose, it was held that no one has a right to turn his horses or
cattle into the highway to graze, except in those parts where he
is the owner of the soil. And if a horse be turned into a road at
another place, although fettered as required by law, if he escape
into an adjoining close, through a defect of fences which the
owner was bound to repair, yet the owner of the horse would be
liable for the trespass. The same principle was asserted in Mills
v. Starc, same book, and several authorities are to be found in a
note on the same subject in Shelford on Railways 507. We have
numerous cases to the same effect in principle in our reports: 1 Y.
167; 9 S. &R. 32; 6W. &S. 378; IBarr336; 8Id. 294.
The learned judge below left the question of due care, on part
of the plaintiff in regard to his cattle, to the jury: telling them
that if he was not guilty of negligence in that respect; in other
words, if his field was sufficiently fenced in which he turned his
mules, and they escaped and were killed on the highway by
negligence of the servants of the company, they would be liable
to pay for them. In view of the authorities and reason already
given, we think this was wrong. It seems to us that the company
is as much entitled to a clear track at crossings, subject only to
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the right of travellers, as anywhere else; and if couchant or
loitering cattle on such crossings have any legal rights as such, 1
am at a loss to discover from whence they are derived. The
authorities are almost universally against the assumption. I do
not mean by this that they may be wantonly destroyed even in
such places, or that gross negligence in regard to them will be
excused. Neither would it be excused in regard to trespassing
cattle on enclosed fields. They may not be killed or their safety
entirely disregarded in that case. With this reservation, arising
out of sentiments of humanity and social duty, the law accords,
but to go further would be to release owners from the appropriate
care due to such property, and to injure the community in
doing so.
SBoth the points I have thus noticed are embraced in the questions reserved by the court, but which it ultimately decided
against the defendant. They are: " 1. That under the undisputed evidence in this case, as the plaintiff's mules were killed
while straying upon the defendants' track, the defendants are
entitled to a verdict."
"2. That owners of cattle killed while straying upon a railroad
cannot recover damages from the company."
I do not suppose that these points were overruled because not
properly qualified by the reservation, that cattle must not be killed
wantonly, or by such gross negligence as to amount to the same
thing. There was nothing like that in the evidence; indeed it
seems to me there was very slight evidence of any negligence
whatever. Treating it therefore as a case of ordinary negligence
at most, the question is, could the plaintiff, under the circumstances, recover ? To say he could, is to affirm these points; and
in doing so, to affirm that straying cattle, standing, lying, or
browsing on the track of a railroad, are lawfully there, so as to
exonerate the owner from all blame if he can show he was ignorant of their escape from his custody. We think we have shown
that this is not the law; and I am sure if it were it would encourage carelessness in regard to the care of animals, increase
litigation, and greatly enhance the perils of railroad travel. The
only way to secure the greatest safety in such a mode of travelling is to hold all obstructions unlawful. Ordinary passage by
the public over a railroad, on a public highway, is in no sense an
obstruction, nor is the passage with droves or horses usually; but
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it is an unauthorized obstruction for roaming beasts to be there,
and as the duty is on the owner to keep them away, he is in fault
in failing to perform the duty, and cannot recover, even if there
was negligence on part of the railroad company's servants in
killing them. Where there is mutual contributing negligence,
neither party can recover for its consequences. The public have
accepted the doctrine of Skinner's Case, and have, to a considerable extent, adapted their circumstances to it, and are constantly
conforming more and more to it; but I am persuaded that the
exception which this case would introduce, were we to affirm it,
would, in the end, greatly impair if not entirely overthrow the
rule itself, which I think all will admit was most wholesome.
The case of Bulkley v. The New York and New Haven Bailroad Company, 27 Conn. Rep. 479, has been examined, and-I do
not think it entitled to the weight given to it below. If I understood the opinion of ELLSWOnTH, J., the plaintiff in error failed to
raise the questions of law which really belonged to the case.
Certain it is, the case seems to have been but little discussed.
Besides ihat, the railroad company seemed to have been in default
in not constructing cattle-guards at the crossing of the public
road, as they were bound by their act of incorporation to do, and
the plaintiff's cattle being at large not, in contravention of their
statute on that subject, the court below left it to the jury to say
whether the plaintiff had exercised " ordinary care" in view of
all the circumstances. It is certainly true that what is " ordinary
care" varies essentially with circumstances. If a railroad were
bound to fence against cattle, the rule of care would be very
different from that where they were not bound, and where the law
declared they were entitled to a clear track. We hold that in the
latter case the owner of the cattle is bound at his peril to keep
his cattle off the railroad, and if he do not, the law treats him as
negligent and not entitled to recover, excepting only in case of
wanton injury or by gross carelessness.
We think judgment should have been entered in favor of the
defendants, non obstante veredicto.

